

Q.2. How did the reform movement of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi influence the history of Muslim India?

1. **Introduction: Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi transformed religious revival into a broader defence of Muslim identity in Mughal India.**

- Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), popularly known as **Mujaddid Alf-i-Sani**, emerged as a major reformer during the reign of Akbar.
- His movement was a response to religious experimentation, syncretism and the weakening of orthodox Islamic institutions.
- He sought to restore the supremacy of **Qur'an, Sunnah and Shariah**.
- His influence was primarily religious and intellectual, but its long-term consequences extended to the development of **Muslim consciousness in India**.
- His legacy subsequently influenced reformers such as **Shah Waliullah** and later Muslim revivalist movements.

2. **Sirhindi's reform movement emerged as a reaction to the religious and political environment created under Akbar.**

2.1 Akbar's religious experimentation created a need for Islamic intellectual resistance.

- **Sulh-i-Kul** and religious experimentation.
- **Din-i-Ilahi (1582)**.
- Increasing imperial involvement in religious affairs.
- Concern among orthodox Muslim scholars regarding the dilution of Islamic teachings.

2.2 The weakening of orthodox institutions encouraged Sirhindi to restore the authority of Islamic scholarship.

- Challenge to the authority of the ulema.
- Greater imperial control over religious interpretation.
- Sirhindi opposed the idea that political authority could redefine fundamental religious principles.

2.3 Muslim society itself required spiritual and moral regeneration.

- Religious practices had become mixed with local customs.
- Sirhindi therefore advocated **tajdid**, meaning renewal or revival.
- His objective was not merely political resistance but the **reconstruction of Muslim religious consciousness**.

3. Sirhindi restored the centrality of Qur'an, Sunnah and Shariah in Muslim intellectual life.

3.1 His concept of tajdid sought to revive authentic Islamic teachings. • Return to

Qur'an and Sunnah.

- Removal of religious innovations.
- Revival of Islamic practices.
- Strengthening of religious education.

3.2 His defence of Shariah challenged the idea of an imperially manufactured religious synthesis.

- He opposed excessive religious eclecticism.
- He argued that Islamic law should retain its independent authority.
- This strengthened the distinction between **political sovereignty and religious truth**.

3.3 His Naqshbandi affiliation provided an organized spiritual network for reform.

Naqshbandi order



Spiritual discipline



Religious reform



Social influence



Revival of Muslim consciousness

4. Sirhindi's opposition to religious syncretism strengthened the distinctiveness of Muslim identity.

4.1 His criticism of Din-i-Ilahi protected Islam from being absorbed into an imperial religious synthesis.

- He rejected the amalgamation of religions.
- He emphasized the distinctive principles of Islam.
- His argument strengthened the consciousness of Muslims as a separate religious community.

4.2 His concept of Wahdat-ul-Shuhud provided a theological basis for his reformist position.

- Emphasized the distinction between **Creator and creation**.
- Offered a corrective to interpretations of **Wahdat-ul-Wujud**.
- Connected spiritual purification with orthodox Islamic belief.

5. Sirhindi's influence gradually contributed to the restoration of orthodox tendencies in Mughal India.

5.1 His correspondence with Mughal nobles spread reformist ideas beyond the religious elite.

- His **Maktubat** became an important source of his intellectual influence.
- Letters addressed to nobles and officials helped disseminate his ideas.

5.2 His confrontation with Jahangir demonstrated the political implications of his religious reform. • Sirhindi was imprisoned by **Jahangir around 1619**.

- His subsequent release and continued influence reflected the strength of his intellectual network.

5.3 The post-Akbar period increasingly accommodated orthodox Muslim sentiment. • The religious environment changed after Akbar.

- Sirhindi's ideas contributed to this intellectual shift, although they were not the sole cause of Mughal policy changes.

6. Sirhindi's greatest historical contribution was the preservation of Muslim religious distinctiveness.

Sirhindi's intervention

Opposition to syncretism

Revival of Shariah

Tajdid

Naqshbandi network

Long-term significance

Preserved religious distinctiveness

Strengthened orthodox consciousness

Inspired later reform movements

Spread reformist thought

Maktubat
Muslim identity

Preserved his intellectual legacy
Contributed to collective consciousness

7. His intellectual legacy provided an important bridge to later Muslim reform movements.

7.1 Shah Waliullah continued the project of Muslim intellectual and religious revival.

Sirhindi → Islamic revival → Shah Waliullah → later reform movements

7.2 Nineteenth-century reform movements inherited the broader principle of religious renewal.

- Deobandi tradition.
- Ahl-i-Hadith intellectual tradition.
- Other Islamic revivalist currents.

7.3 His emphasis on Muslim distinctiveness eventually acquired relevance for Muslim political consciousness.

- Religious identity became an important component of Muslim political mobilization.
- However, **Sirhindi should not be simplistically presented as the direct founder of the Two-Nation Theory.**
- His significance lies in laying an earlier intellectual foundation for Muslim distinctiveness.

8. Sirhindi's influence was historically significant but should not be exaggerated into a purely political movement.

Positive dimension

- Revived Islamic consciousness.
- Challenged religious assimilation.
- Strengthened orthodox scholarship.
- Inspired subsequent reformers.

Limitation

- His movement was fundamentally a **religious and spiritual reform movement**, not a modern nationalist movement.
- Later political interpretations of his ideas sometimes went beyond his original objectives.

9. Conclusion: Sirhindi's enduring contribution was to make religious revival a foundation for the preservation of Muslim distinctiveness in India. Akbar's religious experimentation → Sirhindi's tajdid → restoration of Islamic consciousness → preservation of Muslim distinctiveness → later reform movements → development of Muslim political consciousness

Q.3. “China, Pakistan-Russia cooperation will find suitable support mechanism in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).” Elaborate.

1. Introduction: The SCO can transform separate China-Pakistan and PakistanRussia partnerships into a wider framework of Eurasian cooperation.

- SCO established in **2001**.
- Pakistan became a **full member in 2017**.
- China and Russia are central powers within the organization.
- Pakistan's geographical position connects **China, Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea**.
- Therefore, SCO can provide institutional support for cooperation in **security, energy, trade and connectivity**.

2. The SCO provides an institutional platform where the strategic interests of China, Pakistan and Russia increasingly converge.

2.1 The organization's security mandate directly addresses Pakistan's regional security concerns.

- Counterterrorism.
- Counter-extremism.
- Drug trafficking.
- Separatism.
- Regional instability.

2.2 Its Eurasian character complements Pakistan's geographical position.

China → Central Asia → Pakistan → Arabian Sea

- CPEC can potentially connect with wider Eurasian trade routes.
- Pakistan can become a gateway to the Arabian Sea.

2.3 The SCO allows Pakistan to pursue regional cooperation without becoming dependent on a single bilateral relationship.

3. The SCO can complement China-Pakistan cooperation by connecting CPEC with the wider Eurasian economy.

3.1 CPEC provides the physical infrastructure that can support wider SCO connectivity.

- Gwadar Port.
- Karakoram connectivity.
- Road and rail networks.
- Energy infrastructure.

3.2 Central Asian states can potentially benefit from access to Pakistani ports.

Central Asia



China/Pakistan connectivity



CPEC



Gwadar



Arabian Sea

3.3 SCO can convert CPEC from a bilateral project into a broader regional connectivity opportunity.

4. The SCO can provide Pakistan and Russia with a relatively stable institutional environment to expand their relationship.

4.1 Pakistan-Russia relations have gradually moved beyond their Cold War legacy.

- Diplomatic relations established in **1948**.
- Growing defence and security contacts.
- Greater political engagement.
- Pakistan-Russia military exercises.

4.2 Energy cooperation can become a major pillar of the relationship.

- Russia possesses substantial energy resources.
- Pakistan faces chronic energy and investment requirements.
- Cooperation can extend to oil, gas and power-sector development.

4.3 SCO can reduce the political sensitivity of Pakistan-Russia cooperation.

Rather than:

Pakistan ↔ Russia

the relationship can operate through:

Pakistan ↔ SCO ↔ Russia

5. China-Russia strategic convergence can strengthen Pakistan's position within the SCO.

5.1 China provides economic and infrastructural strength while Russia provides energy and strategic capabilities.

China	Russia	Pakistan
Investment	Energy	Geographic connectivity
Manufacturing	Defence	Gwadar
Infrastructure	Strategic influence	CPEC
Technology	Eurasian reach	Regional access

5.2 Their shared interest in a multipolar Eurasia creates space for Pakistani diplomacy.

5.3 Pakistan can position itself as a bridge between South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.

6. The SCO can help Pakistan, China and Russia coordinate their approaches towards Afghanistan.

6.1 Afghanistan's instability is a common security concern.

- Terrorism.
- Drug trafficking.
- Refugees.
- Border insecurity.
- Extremism.

6.2 Pakistan can use its geographical proximity and diplomatic experience to contribute to regional stabilization.

6.3 China and Russia can complement Pakistan's role through political and security cooperation.

7. SCO cooperation can expand from security into economic integration.

Sector	Potential cooperation
Energy	Oil, gas, electricity
Transport	Railways and highways
Trade	Intra-regional commerce
Security	Counterterrorism
Sector	Potential cooperation
Technology	Digital connectivity
Agriculture	Food security
Investment	Infrastructure
Culture	People-to-people contacts

8. However, geopolitical rivalries could limit the SCO's ability to become an effective cooperation mechanism.

8.1 India-Pakistan rivalry can obstruct consensus.

8.2 China-India strategic competition complicates intra-SCO cooperation.

8.3 Russia-West confrontation can increase geopolitical polarization.

8.4 Different national priorities can prevent the SCO from becoming a fully integrated economic bloc.

9. Pakistan should use the SCO to pursue geo-economic rather than bloc-oriented foreign policy.

- Link CPEC with Central Asian connectivity.
- Expand Pakistan-Russia energy cooperation.
- Strengthen counterterrorism mechanisms.
- Promote intra-SCO trade.
- Develop Gwadar as a regional port.
- Use Afghanistan as a connectivity bridge.

10. Conclusion: The SCO can provide the institutional architecture through which Pakistan converts its geography into strategic and economic connectivity.

China's capital + Russia's energy + Pakistan's geography + SCO's institutional platform = Eurasian cooperation

Q.4. What are the major provisions of the Simla Agreement (1972), and how was it helpful for establishing durable peace?

1. **Introduction:** The Simla Agreement converted the ceasefire after the 1971 war into a framework for peaceful India-Pakistan relations, although it could not permanently resolve the Kashmir dispute.

- Signed on 2 July 1972.
- Signatories: **Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi.**
- It followed the **1971 war** and creation of Bangladesh.
- It aimed to normalize bilateral relations and establish durable peace.

2. **The Agreement emerged from the need to transform the military outcome of 1971 into a sustainable political settlement.**

1971 War



Creation of Bangladesh



Massive military and political crisis



Need for post-war settlement



Simla Agreement, 1972

3. **The Agreement committed Pakistan and India to resolving their differences through peaceful bilateral means.**

- 3.1 Both states agreed to settle disputes through peaceful negotiations or other mutually agreed peaceful means.
- 3.2 The commitment to bilateralism was intended to replace confrontation with dialogue.
- 3.3 The Agreement reaffirmed respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

4. The Agreement transformed the 1971 ceasefire line into the Line of Control and imposed mutual restraint.

- 4.1 The existing ceasefire line was redesignated as the Line of Control.
- 4.2 Both countries committed themselves to respecting the LoC without prejudice to their respective positions on Kashmir.
- 4.3 Neither side was to alter the LoC unilaterally or through force.

1971 ceasefire line → Simla Agreement → Line of Control → mutual restraint

5. The Agreement initiated military disengagement and reduced the immediate possibility of renewed war.

- 5.1 Forces were to withdraw to their respective sides of the international border.
- 5.2 Withdrawal was to be completed within 30 days.
- 5.3 Both states committed themselves to refraining from the threat or use of force.

6. The Agreement attempted to normalize relations beyond the military sphere.

Area	Proposed normalization
Communications	Restoration
Travel	Greater facilitation
Trade	Gradual resumption
Air links	Restoration
Scientific exchange	Promotion
Cultural exchange	Promotion

7. The Simla framework contributed to peace by institutionalizing bilateral dialogue.

- 7.1 It created a diplomatic alternative to military confrontation.

Dispute → Dialogue → Negotiation → Agreement

- 7.2 It reduced the immediate probability of war through military restraint.
- 7.3 It established the LoC as a practical mechanism for managing the Kashmir conflict.

8. However, Simla could not produce durable peace because the fundamental Kashmir dispute remained unresolved.

8.1 The Agreement managed the conflict rather than resolving its underlying causes.

8.2 Subsequent crises demonstrated the limits of the framework.

Event	Year
Siachen conflict	1984
Kargil War	1999
Mumbai crisis	2008
Pulwama-Balakot crisis	2019

8.3 Mutual mistrust repeatedly undermined the spirit of bilateralism.

9. Nevertheless, Simla remains an important foundation for future peace because it provides an established diplomatic framework.

- Respect for LoC.
- Bilateral dialogue.
- Non-use of force.
- Confidence-building.
- Normalization.

10. Conclusion: Simla was a framework for durable peace rather than a guarantee of it.

Its success: prevented the 1971 conflict from becoming an immediate cycle of renewed war. **Its limitation:** failed to settle Kashmir and eliminate strategic mistrust.

Q.5. What is meant by “Proxy War”? Are there any extrinsic factors at play in Pakistan’s internal security situation?

1. Introduction: Pakistan’s internal security crisis has domestic roots, but regional geopolitical competition has repeatedly amplified those vulnerabilities through proxy warfare.

2. A proxy war occurs when external powers pursue strategic objectives indirectly through non-state actors rather than engaging in direct confrontation.

- 2.1 External actors can provide proxies with money, weapons, training, intelligence or political support.
- 2.2 Proxy warfare allows states to pursue strategic objectives while maintaining plausible deniability.
- 2.3 Modern proxy wars therefore blur the boundary between external aggression and internal instability.

External state



Funding / weapons / intelligence



Proxy / non-state actor



Target state



Internal instability

3. Pakistan's internal security problems cannot be explained solely through foreign interference because domestic vulnerabilities provide the environment in which proxies operate.

- 3.1 Weak governance can make regions vulnerable to militant recruitment.
- 3.2 Socioeconomic deprivation can create grievances that extremist groups exploit.
- 3.3 Poor border management can facilitate militant movement.
- 3.4 Sectarian and ethnic divisions can be manipulated by external actors.

4. The Afghan conflict created one of the most important external sources of Pakistan's internal security problems.

- 4.1 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 transformed Pakistan into a frontline state.
- 4.2 The Afghan jihad produced weapons proliferation, refugee flows and militant networks.
- 4.3 The withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 did not eliminate the militant infrastructure created during the conflict.

1979 Soviet invasion



Afghan jihad



Weapons + radicalization + militant networks



Post-war vacuum



Regional instability

5. The post-9/11 Afghan war further transferred the consequences of regional conflict into Pakistan.

- 5.1 The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 intensified regional instability.
- 5.2 Militancy spread into Pakistan's tribal areas.
- 5.3 The emergence of the TTP in 2007 institutionalized a major internal militant threat.

6. India-Pakistan geopolitical rivalry has also influenced Pakistan's internal security environment.

- 6.1 The unresolved Kashmir dispute sustains strategic competition.
- 6.2 Pakistan and India have repeatedly accused each other of supporting hostile non-state actors.
- 6.3 Competition between the two nuclear-armed states creates incentives for indirect forms of confrontation.

Kashmir dispute → strategic rivalry → indirect competition → security pressures

7. Balochistan demonstrates how internal grievances and external geopolitical interests can intersect.

Internal factors

- Political alienation.
- Economic grievances.
- Resource distribution disputes.
- Governance deficiencies.

External dimension

- Regional strategic interests.
- Allegations of external support to separatist groups.

Core argument

External factors can exploit grievances, but grievances themselves must be addressed to eliminate the underlying vulnerability.

8. Sectarian militancy has also been influenced by wider regional ideological competition.

- Funding networks.
- Sectarian ideological influences.
- Regional rivalries.
- Domestic radicalization.

Thus, internal sectarianism can become connected to **broader regional competition**.

9. Pakistan's security crisis is therefore best understood as an interaction between extrinsic pressures and intrinsic weaknesses.

Extrinsic factors	Intrinsic factors
Afghan instability	Weak governance
Regional rivalries	Poverty
Cross-border militancy	Radicalization
Foreign support	Border vulnerabilities
Geopolitical competition	Political grievances

Extrinsic pressure + intrinsic vulnerability = prolonged insecurity

10. Pakistan can reduce the impact of proxy warfare by strengthening internal resilience and regional diplomacy.

- 10.1 Effective border management can reduce cross-border infiltration.
- 10.2 Intelligence coordination can disrupt militant networks.
- 10.3 Economic development can reduce recruitment vulnerabilities.
- 10.4 Regional diplomacy can reduce the strategic space available to proxy actors.
- 10.5 Constitutional governance can prevent genuine grievances from becoming security threats.

11. Conclusion: External actors have aggravated Pakistan's internal security crisis, but durable security requires eliminating the domestic vulnerabilities that make proxy warfare possible.

Q.6. Discuss the main features of Political Culture of Pakistan.

1. Introduction: Pakistan's political culture combines strong democratic aspirations with inherited colonial institutions, patronage politics, personality centered parties and periodic military intervention.

2. Pakistan inherited a centralized bureaucratic political culture that continues to influence governance.

2.1 The colonial state left behind a powerful civil bureaucracy.

2.2 Centralized administration produced a political culture in which the state often remained stronger than representative institutions.

2.3 Bureaucratic influence survived the transition from colonial rule to independence.

3. Repeated military interventions created a political culture in which civilian and military authority have remained contested.

Military intervention	Year
Ayub Khan	1958
Yahya Khan	1969
Zia-ul-Haq	1977
Pervez Musharraf	1999

Core argument

Repeated interventions disrupted democratic institutional continuity and normalized the idea that political crises could be resolved through extra-parliamentary intervention.

4. Political parties have often remained personality-centered rather than fully institutionalized.

4.1 Leadership frequently dominates party structures.

4.2 Internal party democracy remains comparatively weak.

4.3 Political succession is often influenced by family, personality and patronage.

Personality → party control → patronage → electoral mobilization

5. Patron-client relationships remain an important feature of Pakistan's electoral politics.

5.1 Biradari networks influence voting behaviour in many rural constituencies.

5.2 Local elites can convert socioeconomic influence into electoral power.

5.3 Political parties frequently rely on influential local electables.

Resources + influence → local patronage → votes → political office

6. Dynastic politics has contributed to the personalization of political power.

- Bhutto family.
- Sharif family.
- Other influential regional political families.

Critical point

Dynastic politics does not mean that voters have no agency; rather, established political families often possess **organizational, financial and electoral advantages**.

7. Ethnic, linguistic and regional identities have significantly shaped political mobilization.

7.1 Provincial identities influence political demands.

- Punjabi.
- Sindhi.
- Pashtun.
- Baloch.
- Muhajir.

7.2 Regional political demands sometimes emerge when communities perceive unequal political or economic representation.

7.3 Federalism therefore remains central to Pakistan's political culture.

8.

Religion remains an important source of political legitimacy and political mobilization.

8.1 Pakistan's constitutional identity is explicitly Islamic.

8.2 Religious parties and scholars influence political discourse.

8.3 Islam can simultaneously function as a source of national integration and political contestation.

9. Political polarization and weak political tolerance have increasingly affected democratic functioning.

9.1 Political opponents are often portrayed as existential threats.

9.2 Protest and confrontation frequently replace parliamentary negotiation.

9.3 Polarization weakens institutional consensus and policy continuity.

10. Nevertheless, Pakistan's political culture also demonstrates growing democratic participation.

Positive trends

Development	Democratic significance
Regular elections	Electoral legitimacy
Vibrant media	Public accountability
Social media	Political mobilization
Youth participation	New political consciousness
Civil society	Rights advocacy
Judicial activism	Institutional accountability

11. Pakistan's political culture is therefore transitional rather than permanently authoritarian or democratic.

Traditional culture

Biradari + patronage + elite dominance

↓

Transitional culture

Mass politics + media + elections

↓

Emerging culture

Youth participation + digital politics + accountability demands

12. Political culture can become more democratic if institutions replace personalities as the primary source of political legitimacy.

12.1 Political parties need stronger internal democracy.

- 12.2 Local governments need constitutional and financial empowerment.
- 12.3 Parliament must become the central arena of political negotiation.
- 12.4 Political actors must develop a culture of accepting electoral defeat.
- 12.5 Constitutional continuity must replace extra-constitutional solutions.

13. Conclusion: Pakistan's political culture is evolving from elite- and personality-dominated politics towards a more participatory culture, but democratic consolidation requires stronger institutions, tolerance and constitutionalism.

Q.7. "Pakistan's energy crisis was due to the lack of strategy and political will." Discuss.

1. Introduction: Pakistan's energy crisis was not caused by a simple shortage of resources but by decades of inadequate planning, weak governance, distorted incentives and insufficient political will.

2. Pakistan possesses substantial energy resources, which makes the crisis fundamentally a problem of management and strategy.

Available resources include:

- Hydropower.
- Thar coal.
- Solar energy.
- Wind energy.
- Natural gas.
- Nuclear energy.

Core argument

Resource potential $\neq$ energy security because:

Poor planning + weak transmission + theft + circular debt + policy discontinuity = energy crisis

3. Pakistan failed to develop a coherent long-term energy strategy based on its changing demand and resource potential.

- 3.1 Governments repeatedly responded to shortages through short-term generation projects.
- 3.2 Demand forecasting and transmission planning remained inadequate.
- 3.3 Electricity, gas, oil and renewable-energy policies were insufficiently integrated.

4. An inefficient energy mix increased Pakistan's vulnerability to external price shocks.

- 4.1 Dependence on imported fuels exposed Pakistan to international prices.
- 4.2 Oil and LNG imports placed pressure on foreign exchange reserves.
- 4.3 Greater reliance on indigenous hydropower, solar, wind and coal could have reduced external vulnerability.

5. Circular debt became the clearest evidence that Pakistan's power-sector strategy was financially unsustainable.

Key figure

Rs.161 billion in 2008

↓

Rs.2.15 trillion by June 2020

Circular debt cycle

Low bill recovery

↓

Distribution losses/theft

↓

DISCO financial losses

↓

Delayed payments

↓

Generator liquidity crisis

↓

Circular debt

6. Transmission and distribution weaknesses prevented Pakistan from fully benefiting from its installed generation capacity.

- 6.1 Generating electricity is useless if the grid cannot transmit it efficiently.
- 6.2 Technical losses reduce effective supply.

6.3 Electricity theft and weak recovery increase financial losses.

6.4 The result is the paradox of capacity alongside shortages and high tariffs.

7. Political will was lacking because meaningful reform often carried immediate political costs.

7.1 Governments hesitated to undertake politically difficult tariff reforms.

7.2 Electricity theft remained difficult to control in politically influential areas.

7.3 DISCO reform and privatization repeatedly encountered political resistance.

7.4 Subsidies were frequently used as political instruments rather than targeted social protection.

8. Policy discontinuity prevented long-term energy projects from producing their full benefits.

Government A → policy

↓

Government B → policy revision

↓

Government C → new priority

↓

Investment uncertainty

↓

Energy-sector inefficiency

9. Pakistan's energy crisis imposed costs far beyond the electricity sector.

Economic consequences

- Industrial losses.
- Higher production costs.
- Reduced exports.
- Lower competitiveness.

Social consequences

- Load-shedding.
- Educational disruption.
- Household hardship.

Fiscal consequences

- Subsidies.

- Circular debt.
- Government guarantees.

Environmental consequences

- Fossil-fuel dependence.
- Higher emissions.

10. Pakistan has begun shifting towards renewable energy, but implementation must match policy ambition.

- 10.1 Renewable energy can reduce dependence on imported fuels.
- 10.2 Solar and wind can diversify the generation mix.
- 10.3 Hydropower can provide relatively indigenous and long-term energy capacity.
- 10.4 Distributed solar can reduce pressure on centralized generation.

11. Pakistan can overcome the energy crisis only by replacing short-term crisis management with integrated energy governance.

- 11.1 The country needs an integrated national energy plan.
- 11.2 DISCOs must be financially and administratively reformed.
- 11.3 Electricity theft must be tackled through technology and accountability.
- 11.4 Transmission infrastructure must expand alongside generation.
- 11.5 Renewable energy should become a central component of energy security.
- 11.6 Subsidies should be targeted towards vulnerable households rather than inefficient consumption.

12. Conclusion: Pakistan's energy crisis was substantially a crisis of governance, strategy and political will, and solving it requires institutional reform rather than another cycle of emergency generation projects.

Past model:

Shortage → emergency generation → temporary relief → circular debt

Required model:

Demand forecasting → diversified generation → modern grid → efficient distribution → financial sustainability → energy security

Q.8. Discuss revival of Pak-US relations in context of the present US-Taliban peace process.

1. Introduction: The US-Taliban peace process created a strategic opportunity for Pakistan to reset its relations with Washington from a security-dependent partnership towards broader economic and diplomatic engagement.

Exam context: This question belongs to the 2020 paper, so “present peace process” refers to the US-Taliban negotiations culminating in the Doha Agreement of 29 February 2020.

2. Pakistan-US relations have historically oscillated between strategic partnership and mutual mistrust.

Timeline

Period	Character of relations
1950s	Cold War alliance
1960s	SEATO/CENTO cooperation
1979	Afghan War partnership
1990s	Sanctions and estrangement
2001	War on Terror partnership
2011	Severe trust deficit
2018	Major deterioration
2020	Diplomatic opening through Afghan peace process

3. Pakistan became strategically relevant to the US-Taliban peace process because of its geography, Afghan links and regional influence.

- 3.1 Pakistan shares a long border with Afghanistan.
- 3.2 Pakistan has historical relationships with Afghan stakeholders.
- 3.3 Pakistan facilitated communication between the US and Taliban.
- 3.4 Islamabad supported an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process.

4. The Doha Agreement created a diplomatic opening for Pakistan by reducing the centrality of military confrontation in Afghanistan.

Peace process

US-Taliban negotiations



Doha Agreement — 29 February 2020



US withdrawal framework



Intra-Afghan dialogue



Prospect of regional stabilization

5. Afghan peace directly serves Pakistan's security interests.

5.1 Peace can reduce cross-border militancy.

5.2 Stability can facilitate border management.

5.3 Reduced violence can facilitate refugee repatriation.

5.4 Peaceful Afghanistan can become a trade and connectivity bridge to Central Asia.

6. Afghan peace also provides common ground for Pakistan and the United States.

Pakistan's interest	US interest
Regional stability	Orderly withdrawal
Counterterrorism	Counterterrorism
Peaceful Afghanistan	Reduced military burden
Border security	Terrorism prevention
Economic connectivity	Regional stability

7. Pakistan can use its role in the peace process to transform its relationship with Washington from security-centric to multidimensional.

Old relationship

Security → terrorism → aid → mistrust

Proposed relationship

Trade + investment + education + technology + counterterrorism + regional stability

8. Economic cooperation can provide a more sustainable foundation for revived Pak-US relations.

Potential areas

- Bilateral trade.
- US investment.
- IT and technology.
- Education.
- Health.
- Agriculture.
- Renewable energy.
- Private-sector cooperation.

Key argument

A relationship based on **mutual economic interests** is more sustainable than one based primarily on temporary security requirements.

9. Nevertheless, several structural obstacles can prevent a durable revival of PakUS relations.

- 9.1 The longstanding trust deficit continues to constrain cooperation.
- 9.2 Growing US-India strategic cooperation complicates Pakistan's position.
- 9.3 Pakistan's strategic partnership with China creates another layer of geopolitical complexity.
- 9.4 US expectations regarding militant groups remain a source of friction.
- 9.5 Any collapse of the Afghan peace process could again push the relationship towards security-centric tensions.

10. Pakistan should pursue strategic balance rather than replacing one dependency with another.

China



Pakistan



United States alongside:

Russia + Central Asia + Gulf + Europe

Strategic principle:

Diversification rather than bloc politics.

11. Pakistan can convert its Afghan diplomatic relevance into wider geo-economic relevance.

11.1 Afghanistan can connect Pakistan to Central Asia.

11.2 CPEC can connect western China to the Arabian Sea.

11.3 Pakistan can offer itself as a regional trade and energy corridor.

China → Pakistan → Afghanistan/Central Asia → Arabian Sea

12. **Conclusion:** The US-Taliban peace process offered Pakistan a window to reset Pak-US relations, but lasting revival required Pakistan to become an economic and diplomatic partner rather than remain primarily a security ally.

One-line thesis bank for the seven questions

These are the **actual stances** you should keep in your head before attempting each question:

Question	Your central stance
Sirhindi	Sirhindi's religious revival preserved Muslim distinctiveness and laid an intellectual foundation for later Muslim reform movements, although he was not a modern political nationalist.
SCO	The SCO can institutionalize China-Pakistan-Russia convergence by connecting Pakistan's geography with China's economy and Russia's strategic and energy resources.
Simla	Simla created a durable framework for conflict management but failed to produce durable peace because Kashmir and mutual mistrust remained unresolved.
Proxy War	Pakistan's insecurity results from the interaction of external geopolitical manipulation with internal political, socioeconomic and governance vulnerabilities.
Political Culture	Pakistan's political culture is transitional: democratic participation is expanding, but patronage, personality politics, dynasticism and institutional weakness continue to restrict democratic consolidation.
Question	Your central stance
Energy Crisis	Pakistan's energy crisis is fundamentally a governance and strategic-planning crisis rather than merely a shortage of energy resources.

**Pak-US
Relations**

The Afghan peace process offered an opportunity to reset Pak-US relations from a transactional security partnership towards a multidimensional geo-economic partnership.

